by Susan Haack (Author)
In this important new work, Haack develops an original theory of empirical evidence or justification, and argues its appropriateness to the goals of inquiry. In so doing, Haack provides detailed critical case studies of Lewis's foundationalism; Davidson's and Bonjour's coherentism; Popper's 'epistemology without a knowing subject'; Quine's naturalism; Goldman's reliabilism; and Rorty's, Stich's, and the Churchlands' recent obituaries of epistemology.
Back Jacket
In this important new work, Haack develops an original theory of empirical evidence or justification, and argues its appropriateness to the goals of inquiry. In so doing, she provides detailed critical case studies of Lewis's foundationalism; Davidson's and Bonjour's coherentism; Popper's `epistemology without a knowing subject'; Quine's naturalism; Goldman's reliabilism; and Rorty's, Stich's, and the Churchlands' recent obituaries of epistemology.
Author Biography
Susan Haack, formerly Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, is now Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. She is author of Deviant Logic and Philosophy of Logics, and of articles on epistemology, metaphysics, and pragmatism.