{"product_id":"kant-wittgenstein-and-the-performativity-of-thought-paperback","title":"Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought - Paperback","description":"\u003cp\u003eby \u003cb\u003eAloisia Moser\u003c\/b\u003e (Author)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant's \u003ci\u003eCritique of Pure Reason\u003c\/i\u003e and Wittgenstein's \u003ci\u003eTractatus Logico-Philosophicus\u003c\/i\u003e. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant's requirement of an \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c\/i\u003e connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein's idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the \u003ci\u003eTractatus\u003c\/i\u003e' logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called 'zero method', whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ch3\u003eBack Jacket\u003c\/h3\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant's \u003ci\u003eCritique of Pure Reason\u003c\/i\u003e and Wittgenstein's \u003ci\u003eTractatus Logico-Philosophicus\u003c\/i\u003e. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant's requirement of an \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c\/i\u003e connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein's idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the \u003ci\u003eTractatus\u003c\/i\u003e' logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called 'zero method', whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place. \u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAloisia Moser\u003c\/b\u003e is Assistant Professor in the Department of the History of Philosophy at the Catholic Private University in Linz, Austria.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003ch3\u003eAuthor Biography\u003c\/h3\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAloisia Moser\u003c\/b\u003e is Assistant Professor in the Department of the History of Philosophy at the Catholic Private University in Linz, Austria\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eNumber of Pages:\u003c\/strong\u003e 158\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eDimensions:\u003c\/strong\u003e 0.38 x 8.27 x 5.83 IN\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eIllustrated:\u003c\/strong\u003e Yes\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003ePublication Date:\u003c\/strong\u003e August 20, 2022\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Books by splitShops","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":42719135334463,"sku":"9783030775520","price":194.38,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0105\/8226\/1823\/files\/13ff1b3226f15ea45d4247bd4b11ad24.webp?v=1765084522","url":"https:\/\/dhlswag.com\/products\/kant-wittgenstein-and-the-performativity-of-thought-paperback","provider":"BBB","version":"1.0","type":"link"}